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A
nti-Muslim violence 
swept through central 
Burma in spring 2013, 
reportedly sparked by 
an argument at a gold 
shop and the killing of a 
Buddhist monk in the town of Meiktila 
in Burma’s Mandalay Division, on 
March 20, 2013.1 During the next three 
days, attacks spread to neighboring 
townships, as armed groups of men 
from the majority Buddhist population 
reportedly set fire to more than 1,500 
homes,2 destroyed more than a dozen 
mosques and three madrassas, and 
killed more than 100 people3 among 
the minority Muslim population. 
Investigators with Physicians for Human 
Rights (PHR) dispatched to the region 
immediately following these events 
interviewed survivors of a massacre of 
students and teachers in Meiktila on 
the morning of March 21. PHR inves-
tigators returned to the region in late 
April to conduct additional in-depth 
interviews and corroborate testimony 
from survivors, eyewitnesses, and fami-
ly members of those killed. For their se-
curity, the names and identifying details 
of many of these informants have been 
changed or withheld. 
This report includes the most detailed 
narrative to date of the attack on 
Muslim students, teachers, and neigh-
borhood residents in the Mingalar 
Zayyone quarter of Meiktila, as com-
piled from interviews with 33 key infor-
mants, including 14 eyewitnesses. The 
accounts include testimony that local 
police stood by and watched while 
hundreds of people went on a rampage 
of violence and destruction, including 
the killing of unarmed Muslims, and 
that some Buddhist monks incited and 
even participated in the attacks. 
The anti-Muslim violence in Meiktila 
provoked an international outcry, and 
local prosecutors initiated proceedings. 
Three Muslims were quickly convicted 
of theft and assault in April in connec-
tion with the dispute at the gold shop, 
and six Muslim men were arrested in 
May on charges related to the killing 
of a Buddhist monk in Meiktila. As of 
mid-May, however, no one else had re-
portedly been charged or convicted for 
assault, murder, or arson in a massacre 
that left dozens of people dead, thou-
sands displaced, and many of Meiktila’s 
Muslim homes, mosques, schools, and 
businesses destroyed. 
At a time when the United States and 
European Union have been lifting sanc-
tions against Burma and strengthening 
economic ties, PHR hopes this report 
will refocus attention on a horrific 
example of religious violence that has 
become far too common in Burma in 
the past several years, as PHR has doc-
umented. Unless more of that country’s 
political and religious leaders firmly de-
nounce such attacks and take concrete 
steps to hold perpetrators accountable 
and promote reconciliation, Burma’s 
recent slow progress toward greater 
freedom, openness, and peace could 
be derailed.
Introduction 
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4 Background
T
he country of Burma 
(officially the Union of 
Myanmar) has a majority 
Buddhist population 
(approximately 82 percent, 
according to government 
figures) with a minority population of 
Muslims (almost 4 percent, according 
to government figures, but higher 
according to the Muslim community), 
who are concentrated in Arakan State 
and in Mandalay, Bago, Magway, 
Rangoon, and Irrawaddy divisions.4 
Meiktila, a small city in central Burma, 
is located roughly 125 kilometers 
south of Mandalay and 125 kilometers 
north of Burma’s capital, Naypyidaw. 
Meiktila’s population of about 110,000 
people is roughly one-tenth the size 
of Mandalay, Burma’s second-largest 
city.5 
Despite its small size, Meiktila has a 
diverse population of Buddhist, Hindu, 
Muslim, and Sikh communities.6 
Meiktila’s Muslim community account-
ed for roughly one third of the city’s 
population prior to its March 2013 
displacement.7 Muslim residents of 
Meiktila form a sizable portion of the 
city’s commercial sector.8 
Violence against Muslims in Burma may 
have roots in decades-old propaganda 
campaigns that linked Buddhism with 
Burmese national identity.9 Over the 
past decade, repeated incidents of 
violence against Muslims have been 
documented in the areas surrounding 
Meiktila. In 2006, Buddhists report-
edly attacked homes, businesses, and 
mosques belonging to Muslims in the 
neighboring province of Magway, 
resulting in three deaths.10 In 2003, 
riots erupted between Buddhists and 
Muslims in the nearby town of Kyaukse, 
which killed 11 people and resulted in 
the destruction of two mosques and 
dozens of homes.11 In 2001, anti-Mus-
lim violence that broke out across cen-
tral Burma resulted in the destruction 
of numerous mosques, businesses, and 
homes.12
These simmering tensions erupted 
again in three waves of violence against 
Muslims from June 2012 through April 
2013. The first, in early June 2012, oc-
curred when sectarian violence erupt-
ed in Burma’s Arakan State between 
Rakhine and Muslim communities, 
with Muslim communities comprising 
both the widely persecuted Rohingya 
Muslims and non-Rohingya Muslims.13 
The alleged rape and murder of a 
Rakhine woman by three Muslim men 
and the murder of 10 Muslims by 
Rakhines in a reprisal attack are com-
monly cited as the proximate cause.14 
Muslims reported cases of discrimi-
natory and arbitrary arrest as well as 
“physical abuse, rape, destruction of 
property, and unlawful killings by mobs 
of Rakhine Buddhists and security 
forces.”15 Instead of protecting civilians 
at risk, Burmese police either stood by 
and allowed the attacks to continue or 
actively contributed to the violence.16 
The second wave of violence broke 
out in Arakan State on October 21, 
2012, in nine townships. Over 35,000 
people were displaced by the violence 
in October alone, over 97 percent 
of whom were Muslim.17 More than 
100,000 people were displaced by vio-
lence occurring since June 2012.18
Finally, on March 20, 2013, a seemingly 
organized and coordinated wave of an-
ti-Muslim violence erupted in Meiktila 
and swept through Mandalay and 
Bago Divisions, sporadically affecting 
Sagaing, Rangoon, and Magway divi-
sions as well as Mon and Shan States.19 
Anti-Muslim propaganda, often 
preached by the prominent Buddhist 
monk Sayadaw Wirathu, was reported 
in many of these areas as well as in the 
Irrawaddy Division during the same pe-
riod. Largely Buddhist mobs devastated 
numerous Muslim quarters, resulting 
in the partial or full destruction of an 
estimated 1,20020 to 1,600 houses,21 
77 shops, and 37 mosques.22 In late 
April and early May, anti-Muslim vio-
lence and threats of violence resumed 
temporarily in parts of Rangoon and 
Mandalay Divisions.23
According to official figures, the vi-
olence in March claimed the lives of 
44 people24 and another 86 to 93 
people were injured,25 while the at-
tacks on April 30 reportedly left one 
person dead and nine more injured.26 
Alternative unverified estimates indicate 
that as many as 148 persons may have 
been killed between March 20 and 
24.27 Burmese authorities claim that 
the violence displaced 12,846 people,28 
of whom 8,441 remained in seven 
temporary camps in Meiktila as of 
April 9.29 The UN has received reports 
that at least 3,000 more displaced 
people await assessment in affected 
areas within and outside of Meiktila 
Township.30
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T
he findings of this report 
are based on field investi-
gations PHR conducted in 
Burma from March 26 to 28, 
2013, and from April 20 to 
May 2, 2013. The PHR team 
comprised Richard Sollom, MA, MPH, 
director of emergencies at PHR; Holly 
Atkinson, MD, FACP, director of the 
Human Rights Program, Mount Sinai 
Global Health, and assistant professor, 
Department of Medicine, Icahn School 
of Medicine at Mount Sinai; and Bill 
Davis, MPH, former Burma project di-
rector at PHR. 
Qualitative interviews with 
eyewitnesses and other key 
informants 
The team conducted 33 interviews 
with students and teachers of the 
Mingalar Zayyone madrassa in 
Meiktila, as well as religious leaders, 
civil society representatives, and 
government authorities. Among these 
33 respondents were 14 eyewitnesses 
to the Meiktila massacre, whose 
accounts this report details, including 
eight male students. The eyewitnesses 
range in age from 9 to 72 (median 18), 
and include men, women, boys, and 
girls. The eyewitnesses are nearly all 
Muslim, although one man—a member 
of Parliament—is not Muslim.
To select these 14 information-rich 
cases, field researchers conducted 
purposeful intensity sampling to gar-
ner cases that highlighted individual 
involvement and observation of various 
incidents comprising the event (student 
versus teacher versus families living 
in the Mingalar Zayyone quarter). To 
strengthen the qualitative research 
design, field investigators further em-
ployed chain (or snowball) sampling to 
locate corroborating witnesses, who 
were interviewed independently, and 
away from the original source, for pro-
bative evidence. Qualitative inquiry do-
mains primarily centered on the events 
that occurred in the 24-hour period 
from noon on March 20 to about noon 
on March 21, 2013, in the Mingalar 
Zayyone quarter in Meiktila. To ensure 
consistency, investigators followed an  
interview format with probes to elicit 
who, what, where, when, and how a 
reported abuse took place. To facilitate 
documentation of unanticipated issues, 
investigators combined semi-structured 
questions with open-ended questions. 
Interviews were conducted in English 
with a bilingual interpreter in private 
settings. Interviews lasted typically be-
tween one-half hour and three hours. 
Individuals who claimed to have wit-
nessed the massacre were deemed 
credible based on several factors, 
including (1) reporting events that co-
incided with dates and times of known 
events; (2) giving a consistent account 
of events following redundant inqui-
ries from different vantage points; (3) 
citing neutral or positive actions on the 
part of individual Buddhists, such as 
policemen or civilian residents; (4) de-
clining to answer a question when not 
knowing the answer; and (5) present-
ing information in an emotionally con-
gruent way. For example, most of the 
eyewitnesses spoke hesitantly at the 
most graphic parts of their testimonies 
or they showed emotion (e.g., cracking 
of the voice, tearing up, or crying) while 
describing violent events. 
Based on these criteria, all 14 eyewit-
nesses referenced in this document 
were considered credible. The PHR 
team cross-referenced all testimonies 
and found the accounts consistent re-
garding both the specific incidents that 
took place and the timeline of events. 
Based on these testimonies and anal-
ysis of the physical destruction at the 
scene, PHR investigators established a 
nuanced sequence of events that con-
stitute the composite narrative.
Location of the interviews
The PHR field team conducted the 
interviews in four primary locations 
in Burma: (1) Mandalay and two out-
lying villages; (2) Meiktila and three 
surrounding villages; (3) Naypyidaw, 
and one nearby village; and (4) the city 
of Rangoon. Specific village names 
are withheld to ensure the security of 
witnesses. 
The PHR field team exercised security 
precautions while driving to the vari-
ous locations and interviewing study 
participants. When visiting Muslim vil-
lages, establishments, and homes, the 
team engaged a Muslim driver and the 
interpretation services of two Muslim 
translators. But while in predominantly 
Buddhist enclaves—such as the city of 
Meiktila itself—the team engaged an 
interpreter self-identified as Buddhist. 
Because tensions remain high in 
Meiktila, many Muslims were fearful of 
entering the city, and community lead-
ers advised them not to do so. Names 
of interviewees were never written 
down, nor were photos taken of either 
the interviewees or the houses in which 
they were interviewed. All field notes 
were uploaded to a secure site nightly, 
and duplicates were made of all photo-
graphic evidence.
Ethics Review Board approval of 
methods of the investigation
An independent PHR ethics review 
board (ERB) approved the methods 
used for this investigation prior to 
the study. In reviewing the investiga-
tors’ plan to protect human subjects, 
the ERB was guided by the World 
Medical Association’s Declaration of 
Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical 
Research Involving Human Subjects.31 
Methods and Limitations
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As the cohort of most of the report-
ed survivors of the alleged school 
massacre is under age 18, PHR field 
investigators anticipated interviewing 
minors who were eyewitnesses to the 
event. Since this cohort is considered 
a vulnerable population with respect 
to human-subject research, the ERB 
specifically addressed the selection and 
interviewing of children as part of the 
study. Standards that the field team 
followed for interviewing minors were 
guided by ESOMAR’s World Research 
Codes and Guidelines for Interviewing 
Children and Young People,32 
The Population Council’s Ethical 
Approaches to Gathering Information 
from Children and Adolescents in 
International Settings: Guidelines and 
Resources,33 and UNICEF’s Guidelines 
for Interviewing Children.34 All in-per-
son medical evaluations of torture 
and ill treatment were conducted in 
accordance with the United Nations 
Manual on Effective Investigation 
and Documentation of Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (also known 
as the “Istanbul Protocol”).
Precautions were taken to protect the 
privacy and anonymity of the eyewit-
nesses and the confidentiality of their 
personal information. To minimize the 
impact on their physical, mental, and 
social integrity, interviewees in this 
report are provided with single-name 
pseudonyms, and some identifying in-
formation has been withheld.
PHR investigators obtained informed 
oral consent from each participant 
following a detailed explanation of 
PHR, the purpose of the investigation, 
and the potential benefits and risks of 
participation.  Oral rather than writ-
ten consent was obtained to ensure 
anonymity and security. In the case of 
a minor, permission was additionally 
obtained orally from the child’s parent 
or guardian to ensure that he or she 
was confident that the safety, rights, 
and interests of the child were being 
safeguarded during the interview. At 
least one parent of all the children 
interviewed by the PHR field team 
was either present or nearby during 
the interview. Interviews were halted 
if the child became distraught in any 
way. Of the nine interviews conducted 
with minors who were eyewitnesses, 
the PHR field team terminated three 
of them early because of emotional 
distress. PHR investigators employed 
additional safeguards for respondents 
under age 12: The investigators listened 
to their uninterrupted narrations and 
did not ask probing questions. Those 
two interactions were kept purposefully 
short. PHR obtained additional consent 
to conduct a physical evaluation of one 
survivor. This evaluation was based on 
the Istanbul Protocol. 
Limitations of the study
By its nature, this study is subject to 
certain limitations. The field team’s 
qualitative research was designed to 
yield an in-depth understanding of an 
incident in which abuses were commit-
ted by armed groups of civilians and 
complicit officials, including police, at 
one specific location in March 2013. 
The non-random selection of survivors 
of the massacre does not permit gen-
eralization of PHR’s findings to all acts 
of violence against Muslims in Burma. 
Furthermore, seven survivors of the 
Mingalar Zayyone massacre did not 
agree to be interviewed. Anecdotally, 
the PHR field team was told that these 
people had witnessed some of the 
most heinous acts committed, were 
suffering from insomnia, nightmares, 
and other symptoms of psychological 
distress, and were fearful of reprisal by 
the authorities. Thus, the testimonies 
included in this report may not reflect 
the total number or variety of crimes 
allegedly committed. This study is also 
subject to sampling bias as only one 
non-Muslim person is included among 
the 14 witnesses. Moreover, the inves-
tigation’s limited focus does not permit 
a full analysis of the human rights situa-
tion in Burma at the time. 
To mitigate recall bias among interview-
ees, investigators conducted all inter-
views within six weeks of the incident. 
As some trauma survivors are known 
to experience memory impairment 
(dissociation), corroboration was sought 
among eyewitness sources. Further 
corroboration of witness testimony 
was sought and obtained from objec-
tive sources (e.g., physical evaluations, 
crime scene analysis, and review of 
photographic and video evidence). 
This investigative study should thus be 
construed as a snapshot in time, pro-
viding partial rather than complete ac-
counts or prevalence reports of human 
rights violations. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, the study produced suffi-
cient data on which to base informed 
recommendations.
Methods and Limitations
continued from page 6
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T
he following chronological 
account of the killings in the 
Mingalar Zayyone quarter 
of Meiktila on March 20-21, 
2013, is assembled from 
the separate accounts of 14 
eyewitnesses, who experienced the 
violence from a variety of locations and 
perspectives. They included one mem-
ber of Parliament, eight students who 
were able to flee from their madrassa 
after it was attacked at night, and five 
residents of the Mingalar Zayyone 
quarter who were caught up in this tar-
geted violence.  
The resulting narrative is a composite 
constructed from their testimonies 
and verified to the extent possible by 
the PHR field team as described in the 
Methods and Limitations section. The 
names are pseudonyms to protect the 
witnesses’ identities. Each statement 
is attributed to the informant(s) who 
provided it; even when paraphrased, 
the language and descriptors used are 
their own. Time references were facili-
tated by a number of factors, including 
the daily routine of established meal 
times at the school, the prevalence of 
cell phones among the students, and 
the Buddhist practice of marking prayer 
time with the ringing of bells. 
Pseudonyms and reference 
numbers of the 14 eyewitnesses
Preteen students:
• Soe (no. 08)
• Myint (no. 09)
Teenage students:
• Thant (no. 01)
• Maung (no. 02)
• Aung (no. 04) 
• Phyu (no. 13) 
Older students:
• Htun (no. 10) 
• Htay (no. 21) 
Residents of Mingalar Zayyone:
• Thiri (no. 17) – mother and wife of 
slain man 
• Hla (no. 18) – teenage daughter of 
Thiri 
• Yon (no. 19) – teenage daughter of 
Thiri
• Lwin (no. 20) – teenage son of Thiri 
• Sein (no. 21) – young son of Thiri 
Member of Parliament:  
• Win Htein (his real name; no. 25)
Scene of the massacre: An Islamic 
boarding school in Mingalar 
Zayyone 
The town of Meiktila, situated halfway 
between the cities of Mandalay and 
Rangoon in central Burma, had four 
Islamic schools (madrassas). In the 
town’s Muslim quarter of Mingalar 
Zayyone, the well-regarded Himayathol 
Islamic boarding school for boys was 
unique in offering instruction in English, 
Burmese, mathematics, and computer 
science in addition to Islamic studies.35 
The founder of the school, which was 
formerly an orphanage, established the 
madrassa in 2009.36 The school was di-
vided into five classes, from beginner to 
advanced, that were taught by 10 male 
teachers.37 
The boarding school housed 120 stu-
dents ranging in age from 11 to 27.38 
Some of the older students had already 
obtained a university degree, but were 
attending Himayathol for advanced 
religious studies. Htun, for example, is 
an older student who began his studies 
when the school opened in 2009. He 
had previously graduated from a sec-
ular school and then matriculated at 
Mingalar Zayyone for religious studies. 
There were also approximately 20 day 
students, like Soe, a young boy who 
was a student there for the past year 
and a half along with his older brother, 
Myint. Soe and Myint live with their 
family in a small house near the school, 
where their father [name withheld] was 
one of the teachers. [Their father was 
killed during the violence on March 21.]
Composite Narrative of  
Mingalar Zayyone Massacre
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Students hide while violence 
spreads throughout Muslim 
neighborhoods
On the morning of March 20, Myint 
walked to school with his father and 
younger brother as usual. They had 
their midday meal at school and after-
wards he played in his uncle’s [name 
withheld] home next to the school with 
three classmates. One of the women 
who cleaned the school came to tell 
them that there was violence in town 
and a problem at a gold shop.39 Myint 
was across the street, and his father 
called for him to come back to school. 
Shortly thereafter, Myint saw smoke 
rising in the direction of the center of 
town.40 Maung said he and the other 
students did not realize the seriousness 
of the situation at the time and were 
joking around.41 
A man who lived in the quarter also 
came to the school and told the teach-
ers to “keep everyone in the school 
and don’t go into town.”42 One of the 
teachers then told all the boys to go to 
the mosque next door, as they were 
going to make an announcement. The 
boys were told that they were all to 
stay in the school and not venture out 
as it was not safe.43 Three other stu-
dents each similarly reported that the 
teachers informed them that “it was 
not a good situation in town” and that 
a mosque had been attacked and de-
stroyed.44 Sensing there was a problem 
between Buddhists and Muslims, the 
teachers told the students to take off 
their caps (taqiyah) so as not to call at-
tention to their Muslim identity.45 They 
also told the students to remain calm 
and quiet.46 The teacher decided that 
if their madrassa was attacked they 
would not resist and instead would 
plead for the attackers not to harm 
the students. The teachers told the 
students “not to raise a fist” if the “ter-
rorists” came.47 
After the announcement, all the boys—
about 120 of them—went back to 
school to attend classes.48 Later that 
afternoon, Phyu saw black smoke rise 
from the center of town. The teachers 
told Phyu and the other students to 
gather their ID cards and any money 
they had. The group stayed inside the 
building with the lights off.49 
At around 4 p.m. they received word 
that the Muslim quarter close to theirs 
was ablaze and that a mosque near 
the main market had been burned 
down.50 The situation was apparently 
worsening.51 Fear spread throughout 
the school, and some of the students 
began to cry.52 Upon receiving this 
news, the teachers decided to divide 
the school into groups of five students, 
with one teacher or older student 
charged with looking after each group 
of students.53 
Composite Narrative of  
Mingalar Zayyone Massacre
continued from page 8
In the foreground a Muslim home in Meiktila, Burma that has been destroyed while the Bud-
dhist home and temple behind were unscathed. 
Photo: Richard Sollom
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Attack on Islamic school  
and mosque
At approximately 7:30 p.m., after eat-
ing dinner, the students heard news 
that Buddhists were congregating 
and organizing up on the main road, 
with the intent to attack the school.54 
The main road can be seen from the 
school, and Htay said it was terrifying 
to watch the crowd form. He could 
hear them chanting, “Kill the Kalars!” 
(Kalar means “foreigner” and is used as 
an anti-Muslim slur.) Htay couldn’t es-
timate the size of the crowd— he said 
there were too many to count.55
At about 8 p.m., Phyu heard a crowd 
of people outside. Someone shouted, 
“We must not surrender all the time 
to the Kalars!” Some students and 
teachers were receiving phone calls 
warning them that crowds of armed 
Buddhists were coming to the school.56 
At about 8:30 p.m., the teachers closed 
the main door of the school and put 
all the younger boys in the back room 
for safety.57 The teachers told Soe and 
the other students to try to get some 
sleep. But five minutes later, Soe heard 
a lot of noise coming from outside the 
school. Myint also heard loud voices 
and the sound of blowing whistles 
coming closer.58 Both were afraid.59 
At around 9 p.m., a local official from 
Mingalar Zayyone quarter came to 
the school and informed them that he 
would not be able to protect them. The 
“Buddhist terrorists” arrived minutes 
later, according to Maung.60 
At about 9:30 p.m., Aung heard loud 
voices coming from a group of men 
outside the school.61 One of the old-
er students heard what sounded like 
buildings being destroyed a few blocks 
away.62 Students and teachers stayed 
at the school until the armed men sur-
rounded the school.63 There was cha-
os, and some students were crying.64 
Fearing for their lives, all of the stu-
dents and teachers ran out the school’s 
front gate and hid in a nearby area 
called Wat Hlan Taw a few minutes 
away on foot.65 This boggy area, mea-
suring 95 by 80 meters, is overgrown 
with a variety of vegetation, including 
tall grasses.66 
As the group fled the school and 
headed to the grassy area, Htay said, 
they split into smaller groups to hide. 
Phyu and the others hid in small groups 
among the bushes until the early hours 
of the morning.67 Other people from 
the quarter were already hiding in the 
tall grass when they arrived.68 
At that time, a Muslim resident of 
Mingalar Zayyone quarter and mother 
of five children heard a group of peo-
ple coming toward her. At first, Thiri 
and her family were very frightened, 
but then she realized that the students 
from the school had evacuated and 
were joining them in the tall grass.69 
Htay said that the grass was “very high, 
almost up to my armpits,” and that 
they were able to sit in the mud and be 
completely hidden by the grass.70 Sein 
said the grass was “like a jungle, with 
very deep water.” They remained there 
the whole night, standing up and not 
sleeping.71
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Not long after the students joined local 
residents in the grass, a mob set fire 
to the mosque and started to destroy 
the school.72 They were chanting, “Find 
the Kalars and kill them!” Gangs of 
men went door to door in the quarter, 
searching for Muslims. Unable to find 
any in their homes, the gangs left the 
immediate vicinity.73 Thiri’s husband 
became very fearful at this point and 
said he thought they were going to be 
killed. He asked her forgiveness for “all 
the misery he had caused her in life.” 
She said she tried to reassure him, and 
said, “We are safe among the students; 
they wouldn’t kill them.”74
At one point, Thiri said, a car pulled 
up in the quarter, and a local authority 
stepped out and instructed the mob, 
“Don’t set fire to the Kalars’ houses. 
The fire might jump to Buddhist homes. 
But you can destroy all the Muslim 
homes that you want.”75 A 13-year-old 
boy reported that the following morn-
ing he heard a Buddhist monk make a 
similar comment.76
Students watch their school burn 
to the ground
In the dark, the students and oth-
er Muslim residents from Mingalar 
Zayyone quarter hid in the bushes. 
Maung was with a group of six other 
students and a teacher. At around 
3 a.m., the teacher and two students in 
his group left their hiding place to see if 
it was safe to return to the school. They 
did not return. Later, while it was still 
dark, he saw people with flashlights 
around the school, and thought it was 
not safe to go back.77 
Myint heard men near the school yell, 
“Where are you, Kalars? If you have 
courage, come out!” Myint was with 
his father, who told him and the others 
to be very quiet.78 No one slept that 
night as they hid in the bushes.79 Lwin’s 
family stayed awake and alert the en-
tire night, unable to sleep, as they were 
standing in mud and water and were 
very afraid.80
Thiri said her group was exhausted and 
growing more terrified, as fire in the 
quarter moved closer to them in the 
grass. They were unable to sleep, as the 
area they were standing in was water-
logged, muddy, and filled with snakes. 
Thiri tried to comfort her 9-year-old 
son, who clung to her until the early 
morning. All the time they stood in the 
tall grass, they could hear roving bands 
of men destroying homes.81
Hiding in the bushes about 100 meters 
away from the school in Wat Hlan Taw, 
the students watched men attack and 
burn their school and neighboring 
Muslim homes.82 The school was set on 
fire by the men throwing “fire sticks.”83 
That whole night, bands of young and 
middle-aged men armed with weapons 
roamed the Muslim quarter.84 Myint 
was shaking he was so afraid.85 
While it was still dark, Soe heard men 
yelling. One man screamed, “Kill all the 
Kalars! If you have courage, come out-
side.”86 Myint heard a car or mini-bus 
stop on the main road and a group of 
men get out. One of them shouted,  
“A Kalar ran into Wat Hlan Taw. Follow 
him!” Then he saw people with flash-
lights come toward him and the others. 
They were about 20 meters away. 
[Myint drew a detailed map of the 
area.] Myint also heard someone yell, 
“Wake up, people of Oat Kyin.  
Kalars are in Wat Hlan Taw. Show  
your courage and kill them all!”  
[Oat Kyin is the Buddhist quarter  
next to Wat Hlan Taw.]87 
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Flushed out of the grass with 
spotlights, students flee
Soon after the Buddhists began ringing 
the 4 a.m. prayer bell,88 Thiri heard a 
growing crowd congregating on the 
embankment bordering Meiktila Lake.89 
According to Htay, the group spotted a 
Muslim man driving on the main road 
on top the embankment. Htay heard 
the crowd yell, “Catch him and beat 
him!” As the car turned around and the 
headlights shone down the embank-
ment and lit up the grassy area below, 
men up on the road shouted, “There 
are Kalars in the weeds!”90 A man 
yelled, “There’s a Kalar, get him!”91 
Nine-year-old Sein heard the mob cry 
out, “Find and kill the Kalars!”92 
According to Thiri, the mob discovered 
at least one student in the grass, who 
had been slow to follow the rest of 
the group because he was on his cell 
phone talking with his mother. A few 
moments later they heard the group of 
men descend upon the student with 
sticks. Thiri said they listened in horror 
as the group of men beat the scream-
ing student.93  Htay reported that two 
students who remained in the grass 
were killed.94
While it was still dark, the group of 150 
students, teachers, and others from the 
neighborhood who had been hiding 
all night in Wat Hlan Taw began to run 
back toward the school, away from the 
main road.95 The entire group ran to 
get out of the grass and sought refuge 
in a nearby residential compound.96 
Myint saw some in his group break 
down the bamboo fence of the west-
ern wall of the compound, where there 
were four buildings.97 While the stu-
dents were running from the bushes to 
the neighbor’s house, the armed men 
saw them and followed them to the 
house where others were hiding.98 
Seeking refuge in a residential 
compound, women and children 
are attacked
The men escorted the women and the 
younger children, including Myint, to 
the one brick house on the property.99 
Once inside the house, Sein’s mother 
told him to sit on the floor next to his 
sisters.100 “Many were crying, espe-
cially the younger children, and all of 
us were terrified,” Thiri said.101 About 
150 Muslims eventually hid in the com-
pound (120 students, seven teachers, 
five females, and about 20 others 
from the quarter).102 People hid in four 
buildings on the property, according to 
Phyu, who hid with his friends in the 
shed (an empty chicken coop) within 
the walled compound.103 
According to one of the older students, 
a gang came down from the main 
road to the compound and surrounded 
it.104 Some students started to pray, 
chanting Allah Akbar.105 Hearing this, 
the mob outside the compound started 
chanting nationalist songs.106 Maung 
heard loud voices outside and men 
saying they were going to break down 
the gate of the compound. [Several of 
the witnesses drew maps of the area 
depicting four buildings situated within 
a walled compound.]107 
Just before dawn, the wooden fence 
behind the shed was set on fire.108 
Maung’s small group then ran next 
door to another building in the com-
pound and found a large group of 
more than 100 students and others 
hiding inside. At around 6 a.m., the 
mob started throwing rocks, red 
bricks, and flaming sticks of wood at 
the compound where they were hid-
ing.109 Myint described the “fire sticks” 
as pieces of wood wrapped in cloth 
soaked in gasoline and then ignited.110 
From inside one of the houses, Sein 
could hear the mob throwing things 
at the house.111 Through one of the 
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windows, Aung saw around 20 men 
whom he did not recognize begin to 
attack the house.112 
As time passed, more and more of the 
mob came down the embankment and 
encircled the compound, continuing 
to pelt the courtyard and buildings 
with stones, rocks, bricks, and sticks.113 
When the Buddhists began attacking 
the house in which Maung was hiding, 
he and five other students ran out and 
hid in the shed.114 About 10 minutes 
later, Phyu saw a group of armed men 
approach the shed where they were 
hiding.115 
Two younger children were hit in the 
head and face with rocks while sitting 
in one of the houses.116 Some of the 
Muslims started throwing objects back 
at the mob over the compound wall,117 
and the men in the compound armed 
themselves with anything they could 
find on the ground in preparation for 
more attacks.118 Some of the houses 
around them were burning at this 
point—and many of the older students 
in the group were working to put out 
fires.119 
Buddhist monks and police march 
Muslims out of the compound 
Through a window inside one of the 
houses, Myint could see police standing 
on the raised embankment and watch-
ing as the mob attacked the com-
pound.120 Member of Parliament and 
National League for Democracy party 
member Win Htein told PHR investiga-
tors that he had walked from his home 
in Meiktila that morning to Mingalar 
Zayyone quarter. He said the main road 
along the embankment was filled with 
many hundreds of people, including 
police.121 
Between 8 and 9 a.m., an estimated 
15 to 20 police in blue uniforms with 
black and blue helmets, carrying rifles 
and anti-riot shields, arrived in several 
military trucks that they parked on the 
main road along the embankment.122 
They then walked about 200 meters to 
the compound and encircled it.123 The 
apparent commander had three stars 
on his epaulets.124 
From inside one of the houses, Aung 
heard police yell for the occupants to 
come out.125 Htay said the police came 
to the gate of the compound to tell 
them that two students had been killed 
and to request that some of the teach-
ers should go outside into the grass to 
claim the bodies. Htay said everyone 
was too afraid to go outside.126 
A Buddhist monk came to the com-
pound gate, talked to the police, and 
then yelled to the group, “Put down 
your weapons.” A Muslim woman in 
the group went to the gate and said, 
“There are women here. We are not 
associated with the incident at the gold 
shop. We are asking for your forgive-
ness; please don’t set fire to this com-
pound.”127 The monk then asked, “Do 
you want to get out? If you want to get 
out, then you must listen to what I say. 
So put down your weapons.”128 Htay 
heard the monk say to the police, “I 
can take all the students out.”129 
The police told everyone to keep 
their heads down and they would 
be protected from the mob that had 
assembled.130 Those who had armed 
themselves with various objects laid 
them down. Aung believed that the 
police were there to protect them from 
the mob, so he and the other students, 
teachers, and some residents of his 
quarter began to line up two-by-two 
and marched out of the compound 
with their hands clasped behind their 
heads.131 Aung was in the middle of the 
line.132 Thiri, her ill husband, and their 
five children were in the front of the 
line.133 Myint’s father told him to go to 
the front as well. This was the last time 
Myint saw his father.134 
Police lead Muslims through  
the mob
As soon as they left the compound, 
Myint saw the mob begin to club some 
of the students. As he is small, he said 
other students around him protected 
him. Some students were hit with red 
bricks and beaten with motorcycle 
chains and exhaust pipes.135 Myint saw 
men with long swords and slingshots 
attack the unarmed group.136 Aung also 
saw men stone and club the unarmed 
civilians as they were marched toward 
Oat Kyune quarter—about 150 meters 
from the school and beside the pond.137 
Thiri reported that the police did not 
intervene to control the groups of men 
who were destroying the neighbor-
hood.138 Phyu said the police watched 
and did nothing to prevent or stop the 
Buddhists from stoning and hitting the 
students and others as they marched 
out of the compound.139 Myint also 
reported that the police, who were 
holding rifles, did not intervene and 
forced the group to keep marching 
with their hands above their heads.140 
They followed a small path toward the 
embankment where several large mili-
tary transport trucks were parked.141 
Several witnesses reported hearing 
gunshots. Phyu said the shooting start-
ed when someone in the mob threw 
a rock at his group, but hit one of the 
policemen instead. The police officer 
(who wore two stars on his shoulder) 
in turn fired his rifle several times in the 
air.142 Thiri saw the police then shoot 
once into the mob, grazing one of the 
attackers in the thigh. Some of the at-
tackers yelled at the policeman, “Don’t 
shoot us, shoot the Muslims!”143 
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Thiri said she was carrying her baby, 
her husband was leaning on one arm 
(he was having trouble breathing), and 
her younger son was clasping her other 
arm. Her younger daughter was a little 
ahead of them in the crowd, while her 
older daughter walked by her side. She 
and others fell into “newly dug pits” 
along the path. The holes were “about 
waist deep.” She fell into one with her 
baby and had a hard time getting up as 
other people were stepping on them. 
She tried to stand up but fell a second 
time. Then a student pulled her up out 
of the hole.144 Sein was walking beside 
his mother. While on the narrow path, 
he tripped and fell because he was 
trying to avoid “holes in the ground.” 
Lwin encountered the same pits dug 
into the dirt path.145 Both students said 
a lot of broken glass covered the dirt 
path.146
Lwin said the police only pretend-
ed to protect the Muslims but led 
them straight into a group of armed 
Buddhists instead.147 The police told 
them they were going to the main 
road, which was next to the Buddhist 
quarter along the embankment.148 They 
forced the group of more than 150 
Muslims to continue marching along 
the path for about 15 minutes until 
they reached the edge of the Buddhist 
quarter called Oat Kyune.149 Htay heard 
people shouting, “Don’t let any of the 
Kalars come into our quarter.”150 A local 
authority from the quarter shouted, 
“Tanari!”—a derogatory term meaning 
“keep out,” often used in reference 
to dogs—and said that if they came 
into the Buddhist quarter, “We will kill 
you.”151 
File of marchers is abused, beaten, 
and humiliated
When they reached the edge of 
Mingalar Zayyone Muslim quarter, 
Aung saw hundreds of people, in-
cluding about 10 Buddhist monks in 
saffron robes, who did not allow them 
to pass.152A man standing near one 
of the monks shouted, “We will kill 
them all!”153 That monk replied with a 
laugh, “Don’t kill them in your quarter, 
otherwise the Kalar ghosts will come 
here.”154 Thiri heard the monk say, “Let 
them walk to the main road—and we 
can kill them there.”155
Many men carrying bamboo sticks, 
knives, swords, slingshots, chains, and 
motorcycle exhaust pipes then started 
to attack the group.156 Right in front of 
her, Thiri saw one man start to beat an 
older woman with a bamboo stick. One 
of the students ran to protect her, and 
another man took a horizontal swing 
at the boy with a long knife, first slicing 
into his neck. The second blow came 
down vertically on top of the boy’s 
skull, at the frontal bone, and passed 
through the jaw. Thiri said the boy’s 
entire face was sliced off and he fell to 
the ground.157
She then witnessed two students in 
front of her being beaten by a group of 
men with bamboo sticks and exhaust 
pipes. One fell to the ground and didn’t 
move; the other boy fell to the ground 
on his back, and when he moved, a 
man used the end of a wooden plank 
to stab him in the face several times. 
“Only the people in the middle of the 
line of people did well,” Thiri said.158 
Htay, who was in the middle of the es-
corted group, said students in the back 
were severely injured and killed. He also 
said that the attacking gang of men 
targeted the leaders and the wealthy 
in the Muslim community—dragging 
them away and killing them. He said 
about six people he knew from the 
neighborhood were killed, as well as a 
number of students.159 
Htay himself was beaten “many, many 
times.”160 He fell down, and was set 
upon by men with sticks, swords, and 
chains. He was able to get up once, but 
was struck down again. At that point, 
Htay lost consciousness.161 
When Htay regained consciousness a 
few minutes later, he observed that 
the gang who had been beating him 
had moved away and begun to beat 
another student lying face down on the 
ground. When that student lifted his 
head, one of the men lifted his sword 
and brought it down on the back of 
the student’s neck, essentially decapi-
tating him. 
Thiri’s 16-year-old daughter, Hla, said 
Buddhists were handing Muslims pieces 
of pork and forcing them to eat.162 Lwin 
said some of the Buddhists were ha-
rassing the Muslims, taunting them by 
saying, “Here! You must eat this pork!” 
Others were laughing, saying, “Hey, 
don’t feed them too much of it. They’ll 
come to like it, and we’ll have to feed 
them more of it!”163 Thiri said she heard 
some of the police laughing.164
Other Buddhists in the crowd showed 
kindness. Hla was ahead of her mother, 
younger brother, and father. She was 
next to her neighbor who was holding 
her baby. One of the Buddhists in the 
crowd blocking the path recognized 
her neighbor and said, “I don’t want to 
hit you and the baby. Come with me.” 
Hla said the man pulled the woman 
off the path and beckoned for Hla 
and her brother to follow.165 He took 
them into his house at the edge of Wat 
Hlan Taw, where Hla said there were 
already about 15 other Muslim women 
and girls hiding.166 The house owner 
grabbed a head shawl and dressed her 
brother in it so he might be spared as a 
girl if they were all discovered.167
Composite Narrative of  
Mingalar Zayyone Massacre
continued from page 13
Physicians for Human Rights
15
Police and monks force Muslims to 
violate their dietary laws and pray 
as Buddhists 
A Buddhist monk told a group of stu-
dents, teachers, and other Muslims 
to squat on the ground with their 
hands above their heads.168 He said, 
“If you don’t want to die, you must 
sit and worship us.” [Myint and Phyu 
demonstrated the squat position they 
were forced to adopt, with the soles of 
their feet on the ground, knees bent, 
and hands clasped together above the 
forehead.]169 The monk then said, “You 
are under our control, and we can do 
what we want with you. So pray like a 
Buddhist.” And they did.170
Another young eyewitness, Yon, said 
that they were forced to pray, circled by 
men armed with knives. A policeman 
complained that they were not praying 
like a Buddhist but were all cheating 
and praying to Allah; he ordered them 
all to turn to the east and pray like 
Buddha, and they were given more 
pork to eat.171
After the prayers, the police instructed 
the entire group of Muslims to go up to 
the main road.172 Some found the em-
bankment too steep, so they sat back 
down while others continued climbing 
up to the main road. As they were 
making their way up, Yon was separat-
ed from her father.173 Some policemen 
with riot shields stationed themselves 
around the seated group, as if to pro-
tect them.174 Both Lwin and Htay said, 
however, that when someone charged 
them, the police stepped aside and let 
the person attack.175 
Crowd of onlookers encourages 
armed men to attack Muslims
The crowd of onlookers along the 
embankment and on the main road 
numbered many hundreds, according 
to three witnesses.176 Large, armed men 
ran down the bank toward the group 
of Muslims and began attacking them 
with swords, clubs, wooden batons, 
and metal pipes.177 Other Buddhists 
joined—even some of the monks beat 
them, Aung said.178 A 39-year-old 
witness estimated the mob comprised 
about 100 armed men, including 
some 10 to 20 Buddhist monks in 
saffron robes.179 The rest of the crowd 
watched from above.180 Member of 
Parliament Win Htein, who was witness 
to the events, said that some of these 
Buddhists were clapping, cheering, 
and encouraging the men to attack 
and kill.181 Htay heard the crowd on 
the road encouraging the attackers 
too, chanting, “Kill the Kalars! Kill the 
Kalars!”182 
Maung saw “blood the 
color of the monks’ 
[saffron] robes.” He 
thought they would be 
safe because monks 
were there, but instead 
he saw his friends 
being killed.
One monk instructed the mob to go up 
the embankment toward the main road 
to wait for the Muslim group there.183 
Thiri, with a baby still in her arms and 
her feeble husband, older daughter, 
and younger son at her side, started 
up the embankment to the main road. 
Suddenly, two men appeared in front 
of her. “We are only allowing women 
to the main road.” One of the men 
shoved his hand in her husband’s face, 
knocking him backward off his feet. 
The other man tried to pull her baby 
son from her arms. A third man yanked 
her 13-year-old son away from her, 
saying to Lwin, “You’re a boy, you can’t 
go with her.”184 A policeman standing 
nearby grabbed Lwin’s arm and pulled 
him away from the attacker, saying, 
“Let him go!” and shoved him back 
toward his mother. Lwin said, “I know 
that policeman saved my life.”185 Thiri 
and the other women, now in a group, 
went up to the main road, several of 
them leaving their husbands behind.186 
When the women reached the main 
road, they were again instructed to “sit 
down, pull down your scarf, and don’t 
look back.”187
Police stand by as armed gangs 
massacre unarmed Muslims 
One of the local leaders told the seated 
group not to move, according to two 
witnesses.188 One of the older students, 
Htay, said that his classmate, [name 
withheld], moved slightly to reposition 
his legs and was suddenly attacked by 
two men. One had a sword and used it 
to slice open a long gash in the young 
man’s quadriceps muscle. Another at-
tacker poured gasoline into the bleed-
ing wound and lit him on fire. Htay said 
the group on the ground, only about 
30 meters away, watched his classmate 
burn to death by the water well. They 
were all terrified but were trying not to 
move, fearing they might be killed as 
well.189 In perhaps the same event, an-
other student saw one man stab a boy 
who was on fire. Maung saw “blood 
the color of the monks’ [saffron] 
robes.” He thought they would be safe 
because monks were there, but instead 
he saw his friends being killed.190
According to two witnesses, four men 
beat with hard bamboo another young 
student in the grove of trees below 
the embankment. A young female, 
Hla, said that while the boy was still 
shaking and twitching on the ground, 
someone poured gasoline on him out 
of a plastic container and set him on 
fire.191Aung also witnessed this event. 
He saw someone pour clear liquid from 
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a one-gallon jug on his 10-year-old 
classmate and then use a lighter to set 
the boy on fire. Aung watched in terror 
some 10 meters away while the young 
boy fell to the ground burning and 
screaming in agony.192 
Thiri’s husband was stabbed with a 
knife twice in the abdomen, according 
to one of the older students present.193 
The mob then dragged his body and 
four others to form a pile. While “the 
bodies were still shaking and moving” 
two women collected dried leaves un-
der the trees and threw them on top 
of the men, poured gasoline on them, 
and lit a fire, according to two wit-
nesses.194 Thiri smelled burning flesh, 
and grabbed the leg of a policeman 
who was standing near her. She said, 
“There’s a fire! Please, please put it 
out!” The policeman replied, “Don’t 
look back; if you do, we can set fire to 
you, too.”195
Yon heard a monk  
say,“If you want to  
kill the plant, you  
need to cut the root.  
If you come back,  
we will kill you all.”
Nineteen-year-old Phyu saw 17 of his 
friends and fellow students stabbed 
and killed. [During the interview, Phyu 
listed their names, including five of his 
closest friends, and approximate ages. 
He began to cry.] He saw other lifeless 
bodies on the ground, but could not 
identify them because he did not see 
their faces.196 
Aung also reported witnessing five 
men with clubs and swords attack his 
20-year-old classmate. One of the men 
stabbed the young man three times in 
the stomach after he had fallen to the 
ground. According to Aung, the police 
and monks watched and did nothing to 
prevent or stop these killings.197 
While Myint’s group sat on the grassy 
field, the monks and police told the 
others to march up the embankment 
toward the trucks parked on the main 
road. It was then that Myint saw a 
man club his friend, Abubakar, a fellow 
student about his age. Abubakar fell to 
the ground. Myint next saw Abubakar 
burning alive. Another man told Myint 
to keep his eyes down, saying: “If 
you dare look up, we will beat you to 
death.” Crying and shaking with fear, 
Myint remained squatting looking 
down at the ground for about 30 min-
utes while he heard others being beat-
en. Finally Myint’s group was told to 
stand up and march to the trucks.198 
After about 10 minutes of sitting in 
terror, Htay said his group was told to 
slowly crawl up the embankment, keep 
their heads down, and not look at the 
killing going on around them. If they 
ran, they would be killed. Htay said that 
he did keep his head down and that as 
he climbed through the grove he was 
climbing past body parts—arms, hands, 
legs, and feet—that had been hacked 
off.199
When Yon and her family made it to 
the road, she said they were told to sit 
down again. As she turned to reposi-
tion herself, this witness reported see-
ing a man behind her near the grove 
holding up the decapitated head of a 
Muslim by the hair. The facial muscles 
were still twitching. Then she heard a 
monk say, “If you want to kill the plant, 
you need to cut the root. If you come 
back, we will kill you all.”200
Sein’s group was told to move to the 
main road. At that point, as they tried 
to go forward, large mobs in front of 
them and behind them blocked their 
path so they couldn’t escape. He said 
the attackers were beating people with 
bamboo sticks, and killing them with 
knives and swords. They were cutting 
people’s throats and doing “many bad 
things.”  [Sein’s eyes opened wide. He 
looked afraid, teared up, and the inter-
view was stopped.]201
Piles of charred corpses lie strewn 
across the field
MP Win Htein was present and stood 
among the crowd on the main road 
along the embankment. According to 
this member of Parliament, the police 
commissioner and district commissioner 
were also present. Win Htein reported 
that some 200 police were present, 
and none intervened to prevent or 
stop the killings. He saw seven young 
teenagers who were dead, lying in 
the grassy area below.202 Thant saw 
“many black” [charred] bodies on the 
ground.203 Maung saw seven bodies on 
the ground after the group was finally 
told to get up and go to the military 
trucks nearby.204 As Myint walked look-
ing down with his arms above his head, 
he saw three lifeless bodies at his feet. 
The mob continued to attack them as 
they mounted the trucks.205 According 
to Win Htein, the bodies lay on the 
ground for two days. Finally, municipal 
workers were instructed to pick up the 
bodies and take them to the crematori-
um. They were not identified nor were 
their families notified.206
The police told the seated group to 
climb up the embankment where 
three trucks were parked on the main 
road.207 The policemen loaded some 
students onto the first truck, and 
the women and girls were put in the 
second truck.208 A monk yelled to the 
police while they were loading, “Take 
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them to Yin Taw Village [a Muslim en-
clave], where they belong!”209 When 
Aung got to the trucks, two of the 
three were already filled. His group 
climbed onto the third truck and he  
estimates they rode for about 15 min-
utes until they arrived at Meiktila’s 
No. 2 police station at around noon  
on March 21.210 
Police detain survivors at No. 2 
police station in Meiktila
When the students, teachers, and other 
residents of Mingalar Zayyone quarter 
arrived at the police station, more than 
80 students and teachers were sepa-
rated from the others and put in one 
packed room inside the station.211 
Htay lay on the floor and slept “for a 
long time.” When he woke up he had 
a very bad headache and was dizzy. 
Then he noticed that his hands were 
extremely painful and he couldn’t move 
them. One of his friends told him he 
had blood all over his back. He then 
realized he had been cut in several plac-
es. He had wounds on his left thumb 
and forearm and right hand, and 
several superficial—although heavily 
bleeding—wounds on his back.212 Htay 
could not pinpoint the moment he was 
injured, although he recalled passing 
out soon after the armed men started 
beating him.
Thiri said that during the first two hours 
at the police station, the police “gave 
us a lot of sermons. They said they 
sympathized with us and that they had 
tried to save our lives. And they said 
they were sorry for what happened.” 
Some of the police said, “We are afraid 
of the monks too, and the monks hate 
us for saving your lives.”213
Aung said some of the police called 
the Muslim detainees “terrorists.” They 
were given a small amount of rice and 
water each day. Maung said he re-
ceived only three biscuits and water.214 
Aung also said that a military officer 
wearing three stars came to the po-
lice station and told his group to keep 
calm.215 
Htun made a list of all the students in 
the jail. From one of the police officers, 
Htun bought a notebook for 200 kyat 
(about 25 cents) and then wrote down 
the names (both Burmese and Arabic), 
ages, fathers’ names, and addresses 
of 88 students. [During the interview, 
Htun drew a detailed map of the police 
station.]216 Phyu remembered giving 
Htun all of this information, which he 
wrote down on paper.217 Later that 
afternoon, Myint could see through the 
cracks in the wall a mob of armed men 
outside the police station. Buddhist 
monks were among them.218 
Muslim survivors are reunited with 
their families
At 10 a.m. Saturday, March 23, most 
of the detained students and several 
teachers were loaded into three bus-
es and driven with police escort to 
Tapatswe village about 90 minutes 
away near Mandalay where they were 
reunited with their families. They ar-
rived around 11:30 a.m. and were tak-
en to a mosque where they were fed. 
Township authorities and religious lead-
ers wrote down the names of students 
before they left with their families who 
had come to pick them up.219 [During 
the interview, Phyu began to cry at this 
point and said how much he missed his 
friends who were killed.]220 
Myint remained in the police station 
with his older cousin, his aunt, and her 
three young children.221 They remained 
because they were not part of the 
group of students being transferred.222 
On March 24 the group of six was 
picked up by Htun’s relatives who had 
come to drop off food for the detain-
ees. He and his female relatives were 
then able to leave the police station 
with their relatives.223
A man takes pictures of burnt bodies in Meiktila, Burma on March 22, 2013. 
Photo: STR/AFP/Getty Images
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PHR used other forms 
of documentation 
to corroborate the 
events described in the 
eyewitness interviews:
1 Visual verification of  actual locations of reported human rights violations
2 Review of photographic,  video, and satellite evidence  
3 Physical evaluation of  one survivor  
4 Psychological distress  among survivors  
5 Comparison of the community’s list of the missing (presumed) dead, with eyewitness accounts
6 Corroboration of data with concurrent events reported  in several media accounts
1. Visual verification of actual 
locations of reported human rights 
violations
The PHR team twice visited the scene 
of the massacre in the Mingalar 
Zayyone quarter in Meiktila. The PHR 
team visited and photographed all 13 
mosques in the city, of which 12 were 
damaged or destroyed. The team also 
visited the three principal madrassas 
within Meiktila and documented the 
destruction, as well as determined the 
location of five temporary camps for 
displaced persons in and around the 
city. The team also photographed the 
extensive damage to Muslim business-
es and homes throughout Meiktila. 
Photographs were taken with a Nikon 
Coolpix AW100, a Sony DSC-WX80, 
and an iPhone 5. Two of the cameras, 
the Nikon Coolpix and iPhone, are 
capable of recording GPS coordinates 
on each image. The team logged all im-
ages into a photographic database, re-
cording the image number, description, 
time, date, and GPS location of the site. 
2. Review of photographic, video, 
and satellite evidence 
The PHR team also reviewed over 
450 photos and 37 videos taken on 
March 23 by Hein Aung, a professional 
Burmese journalist and photographer, 
two days after the massacre. Hein 
Aung also accompanied PHR investiga-
tors on both of the trips into Meiktila 
to photograph the physical destruction. 
He indicated where he had taken spe-
cific photographs on March 23.
PHR investigators also interviewed  
Jason Szep, a Reuters journalist who 
was at the scene of the massacre on 
March 24. He wrote: “[O]n the hill 
where Muslim bodies were burned, this 
reporter found the remains of a mix of 
adults and children: pieces of human 
skull, vertebrae and other bones, and 
a singed child ’s backpack. Nearby, 
municipal trucks dumped bodies in a 
field next to a crematorium in Meiktila’s 
outskirts. They were burned with old 
tires.” Reuters and other news media 
published images of these burning 
corpses. 
In addition, PHR investigators reviewed 
some 30 videos taken by unidentified 
individuals at a number of the alleged 
incidents that marked the violence over 
the period March 20-21. Comparison 
of landmarks in the PHR investigators’ 
photographs to landmarks in the videos 
suggests, though cannot confirm, that 
these videos record the events de-
scribed to PHR investigators by eyewit-
nesses and documented in this report. 
One video in particular shows several 
piles of burning bodies in the area 
where the eyewitnesses reported that 
many of the killings had taken place. 
The PHR team also reviewed Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) satellite images 
of the city of Meiktila, recorded on 
the morning of March 26, 2013, and 
compared them with images taken on 
December 13, 2012. HRW identified an 
estimated total of 828 destroyed and 
35 severely damaged buildings within 
the city, likely caused by arson attacks 
reported to have occurred.224
In an effort to authenticate photo-
graphs and videos reportedly taken at 
the site and time of the killings, PHR 
investigators twice traveled to Meiktila 
to visually inspect, photograph, and log 
GPS coordinates of the alleged crime 
scene. Through comparison analysis of 
landmarks and other distinctive objects 
in the vicinity captured in PHR photo-
graphs and videos, PHR investigators 
conclude that these photographs and 
videos are highly likely to be authentic 
and thus constitute strong evidence 
of the killings that the witnesses have 
recounted in this report.  In addition, 
logged GPS coordinates and visual in-
spection of the crime scene corroborate 
destruction that HRW satellite images 
captured. 
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3. Physical evaluation of the healed 
wounds of one survivor 
On April 27, a PHR physician inter-
viewed and examined Htay, an adult 
student at the Mingalar Zayyone 
school. As reported above, he was at-
tacked by several men—he could not 
estimate the number because they de-
scended upon him so quickly—armed 
with sticks, chains and swords. He was 
knocked down, got up once, but then 
was struck down again. At that point, 
Htay lost consciousness for what he 
guesses were just a few minutes. Upon 
regaining consciousness, he tried to 
quickly catch up with his group. He did 
not notice his injuries until he arrived 
at the police station. While at the po-
lice station, he suffered from a severe 
headache, experienced dizziness, and 
was bleeding from wounds on both his 
hands, his left forearm, and his back. 
He has suffered no subsequent symp-
toms except for insomnia and night-
mares. He received one stitch at the 
police station for the laceration on his 
left hand.  He specifically gave consent 
for the PHR investigator to examine and 
photograph his healed wounds.
Htay was anxious, although in control 
of his emotions, during the exam. 
Inspection revealed several well-healed 
lacerations: (1) a 5-cm laceration 
running from the thenar eminence 
around the base of the thumb onto 
the dorsal aspect of the hand; (2) a 
2-cm straight laceration on the left 
forearm; (3) three small lacerations on 
the back of the right hand, forming a 
slight arc measuring about 5 cm total; 
and (4) four lacerations at various 
angles on his back. Two lacerations 
measured approximately 10 cm, one 
measured approximately 16 cm and 
one measured 20 cm. All six lacerations 
are highly consistent with his testimony 
of being struck with a weapon such as 
a sword or knife.
4. Psychological distress among 
survivors 
All eight students whom PHR investiga-
tors interviewed reported some psycho-
logical distress. Sixteen-year-old Maung 
has nightmares nearly every night. He 
dreams of his friends whom he saw 
killed and wakes up crying.225 Twelve-
year-old Myint also has nightmares 
each night and said that a doctor gave 
him medication so he could sleep.226 
One of the teenage students, Lwin, 
said that the smell of the burning 
bodies was overwhelming, and that 
he now has olfactory flashbacks and 
trouble sleeping. One of the recurring 
nightmares he has is reliving the scene 
of roving dogs eating the flesh of the 
dead bodies in the grove. He also has 
nightmares in which he sees the confla-
gration of the school, and people from 
his neighborhood fleeing the scene 
and screaming. He cries “almost every 
day” and feels very fearful about the 
future.227  
5. Comparison of community’s  
list of the missing with eyewitness 
accounts
PHR investigators were given a list of 
names of students and teachers of 
Mingalar Zayyone madrassa, or resi-
dents of the Mingalar Zayyone quarter, 
who were still unaccounted for and 
presumed dead. Muslim community 
leaders compiled the list after consult-
ing with families. The list included the 
names of 33 students, four teachers, 
and 38 residents of the quarter. PHR 
asked each of the 14 eyewitnesses 
whether they had personally witnessed 
the death of someone they knew, and 
if so, requested the person’s name. 
Based on their responses, of the 75 
names on the community list, PHR was 
able to account for 20 of these people. 
6. Corroboration of data  
with concurrent events reported  
in the media  
As of early May 2013, PHR’s analysis of 
independent media coverage yielded 
reports of anti-Muslim unrest in an 
estimated 26-28 townships in Burma 
during and after the March 20-23 vio-
lence in Meiktila.228 Property damage 
was reported in approximately 19-20 of 
these townships. Another eight town-
ships reportedly experienced new or 
increased anti-Muslim propaganda or 
vandalism during this period, reportedly 
causing Muslim residents to pre-emp-
tively flee from at least one of these 
townships.229 The majority of docu-
mented violence in Meiktila took place 
during March 20-23. While estimates 
vary, the Meiktila violence seems to 
have sparked more than 160 incidents 
in as many as 15 townships, towns, or 
villages.
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T
he 14 eyewitness accounts 
presented in this report, 
corroborated by other doc-
umentation, provide com-
pelling evidence that police 
officers were complicit in 
violent crimes against civilians. Such 
acts on the part of law enforcement 
officers blatantly violate even the most 
rudimentary provisions of Burma’s own 
penal code230 as well as international 
norms. The UN Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials, for exam-
ple, stipulates that police officers must 
protect people from crime,231 and this 
service to the community is intended to 
include rendering assistance to those 
who are in need of immediate aid. The 
standards require law enforcement 
officials to protect the rights of all peo-
ple.232  
The eyewitness reports detailed in this 
report demonstrate that the majority of 
police officers present during the vio-
lence in Meiktila fell far short of this 
professional standard, not only by 
failing to protect vulnerable children 
and others at risk but by failing to 
apprehend the perpetrators. The crimes 
in Meiktila indicate a failure of leader-
ship within the Burmese police force 
that must be addressed through effec-
tive accountability mechanisms and 
security-sector reform.
The testimonies of those interviewed by 
PHR demand a concerted and effective 
response from both the Government of 
Burma and the international commu-
nity. The serious crimes documented 
in this report require immediate ac-
tion: an independent investigation of 
the violence and accountability for all 
perpetrators in compliance with fair 
and internationally recognized legal 
standards. 
The crimes in Meiktila occurred in a 
general national context marked by 
a lack of accountability for perpetra-
tors of human rights violations. The 
Government of Burma must respond 
effectively not only to this incident but 
to the long history of systematic human 
rights violations on the part of Burmese 
authorities. The people of Burma face 
the important long-term task of build-
ing a society based on tolerance and 
understanding, and reckoning with 
past violence is a key element of this 
social reconciliation. The Government 
of Burma has an important role to play 
in this process, and must institutional-
ize the protection of minority groups 
across the country and establish and 
maintain effective accountability mech-
anisms in order to move the country 
out of a culture of violence.
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To the Government of Burma:
Senior officials, pro-democracy 
advocates, and religious leaders should 
publicly and repeatedly condemn 
all ethnic and religious violence and 
intimidation, and should demonstrate 
by their words and actions that such 
discrimination and hateful rhetoric will 
not be tolerated. The Government of 
Burma should also:
• Immediately allow unfettered access 
by human rights investigators, 
journalists, and humanitarian aid 
workers to Meiktila, areas of Rakhine 
State, and other places where acts of 
anti-Muslim violence have occurred.
• Institutionalize protections for ethnic 
and religious minority groups by: 
(1) completely revising Burma’s 
citizenship law so that it reflects 
international norms; (2) reforming 
the structure of the military and 
police to establish accountability 
mechanisms; (3) bringing an end 
to ethnic discrimination in all 
sectors; and (4) encouraging full civil 
participation by minority groups.  
• Provide mental health counseling 
and other appropriate health care 
for those affected by the violence, 
with a special focus on the particular 
needs of children. 
• Collaborate with international 
humanitarian agencies, including 
the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and UNICEF, to trace 
missing children and reunite families 
separated by the violence.
• Promote the protection of children by 
adhering to the Minimum Standards 
for Child Protection in Humanitarian 
Action, promulgated by the Child 
Protection Working Group.
To the international community:
• Immediately establish an 
international, independent 
investigation of the massacre in 
Meiktila as well as other sites of 
anti-Muslim violence. Members of 
the United Nations Human Rights 
Council should direct the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to conduct this necessary 
investigation. The Government 
of Burma should cooperate with 
any investigation and assist in 
implementing any recommendations 
from the investigators.
• Tie economic aid to and investment 
in Burma to the Burmese 
government’s allowing unfettered 
access to areas of violence to human 
rights investigators, journalists, 
and humanitarian aid workers 
and to the government’s progress 
in investigating and prosecuting 
perpetrators of the violence. Until the 
Burmese government has established 
full accountability for security forces 
and has undertaken significant steps 
toward structural reforms as outlined 
above, no security assistance should 
be provided.
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Residents look at the charred remains of burnt bodies in Meiktila, Burma on March 23, 2013. 
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